


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PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

April 10, 1984

Executive Registry 1697



Honorable William J. Casey Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

The President's report to the Congress on Soviet compliance with arms control agreements has once again raised the critical question of the ability of the United States to adequately verify such agreements -- not only those which have been inherited from previous Administrations, but also those which the present Administration is actively pursuing, and those which, like an anti-satellite weapons ban or the Comprehensive Test Ban, are actively discussed, although not presently under negotiation.

It is clear that the present Administration believes that the relationship between monitoring capabilities and specific arms control provisions has become a critical issue. No longer is this relationship viewed as just one of many problems to be dealt with in the effort to work out sound agreements, but a problem which threatens to block any significant progress in arms control. In the past, the Intelligence Community has almost always been able to provide monitoring services that liberated policymakers to pursue sensible arms control measures. If a gap is now emerging between what the community can provide and what policymakers in this or a subsequent Administration may need, that would be a matter of concern to the Congress generally, and to this Committee specifically.

With the above in mind, I invite you (or your designee), as I have the Secretary of State and the Director of ACDA, to represent the Administration at executive session briefings designed to get at this question. Because of the extensive scope of the problem, the Committee has set aside a substantial period of time on April 24 and 25, 1984 for this purpose. Finally, the Committee plans to arrange a third, public session on April 26, 1984 to involve former ranking officials of previous Administrations, to get their perspectives on the adequacy of intelligence monitoring capabilities to support arms control.

Enclosed herewith is a proposed schedule for the briefings. Mr. Leon Fuerth, of the Committee staff, will be the Committee's point of contact for further arrangements. He can be reached at 225-0788.

With every good wish, I am

Enclosure

## Preliminary Schedule

## April 24, 1984, 3:00 p.m.

- Overview of links between policymakers and intelligence community on arms control.
- Overview of intelligence community services in support of arms control.
- Concepts and standards of effective verification and monitoring requirements in support of it.
- Verification and monitoring problems and issues.
- Discussion to focus in this session, to the extent possible on existing arms control measures (e.g., ABM Treaty, SALT I and II, TTBT/PNET and others).

## April 25, 1984, 3:00 p.m.

- Implications of ongoing negotiations for monitoring and verification. (START, INF, MBFR, CW)
- Issues relating to monitoring of other arms control concepts (e.g., ASAT, CTB).
- Processes by which requirements of arms control proposals such as these and intelligence monitoring capabilities are fitted together as between policymakers and intelligence producers.

## April 26, 1984, 3:00 p.m.

Views of experienced former officials on types of issues described above.